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1.- Introduction  
 
 A core proposition in modern macroeconomic theory holds that market economies 
possess strong self-regulation mechanisms which guarantee that any expansion of 
potential output eventually generates an equi-proportional increase in the level of 
aggregate demand so that the latter adjusts passively to the former in the long run. This 
proposition is an implication of Say’s law, i.e., the notion that supply creates its own 
demand. Presumably, this proposition also holds that, in steady growth, the rate of growth 
of output equals its ‘natural’ rate, the latter being equal to the sum of the rate of growth of 
labor productivity and labor force. The mechanism through which this adjustment process 
takes place is a crucial area of macroeconomic theory yet it is frequently overlooked. In 
modern economic analysis, such mechanism usually comes in the form of the Scitovszky-
Pigou-Haberler-Patinkin effect or ‘real balance effect’1. However, a number of scholars 
have cast serious doubts into its practical relevance. For instance, Greenwald and Stiglitz 
argue that: 
 
  ‘The enormous attention that the real balance effect has received over the years 
hardly speaks well for the profession. Quantitatively, it is surely an nth order effect; one 
calculation put it that, even at the fastest rate at which prices fell in the Great Depression, 
it would take more than two centuries to restore the economy to full employment. And in 
the short run even its sign is ambiguous, as intertemporal substitution effects may 
(depending on expectations) more than offset the wealth effects’ (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 
1993a, p.36). 
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We will not discuss here the shortcomings of the real balance effect2. We may 
note, though, that some authors appear to be leaving it behind and resort to other (though 
not necessarily more reliable) self-adjustment mechanisms. For instance, proponents of 
the so-called ‘modern’ view of macroeconomics (Clarida et al., 1999, pp. 1665-66; 
Taylor, 2000, p.91) use an aggregate demand function of the form uary +−= , where  
is the output-gap, 
y
r  is the real interest rate and  is a stochastic component with zero 
mean. We have argued elsewhere that this relation does not hold unless it is assumed that 
aggregate demand shocks of the same sign and similar magnitude increase (decrease) the 
level of aggregate demand whenever a favorable (unfavorable) shock raises (lowers) 
potential output (Palacio-Vera, 2005). The mechanism through which increases in the 
latter lead to equivalent increases in aggregate demand is explained as follows: 
u
 
‘Shocks to potential output also do not force a short-run trade-off. But they 
require a quite different policy response. Thus, e.g., a permanent rise in productivity 
raises potential output, but it also raises output demand in a perfectly offsetting manner, 
due to the impact of permanent income. As a consequence, the output gap does not 
change. In turn, there is no change in inflation. Thus, there is no reason to raise interest 
rates, despite the rise in output’ (Clarida et al., 1999, pp. 1675)  
            
 Apparently, these authors assume that an increase in potential output is ‘perfectly’ 
observed by individuals and ‘interpreted’ as leading to an equivalent rise in expected 
lifetime wealth. In turn, insofar as individuals tend to smooth consumption overtime the 
expectation of higher expected lifetime wealth leads them to consume more in the present 
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and in the future. However, this self-adjustment mechanism is unrealistic and, if it exists 
at all, it is likely to be negligible. Instead, the institutional framework that characterizes 
most, if not all, OECD economies is one where the Central Bank (hereafter CB) fine-
tunes the economy through changes in short-term interest rates and attempts to keep the 
rate of growth of aggregate demand in pace with potential output.  
We don’t wish to deny that there may well be other self-adjustment mechanisms 
at work. First, we recognize that the foreign sector may play a significant role through the 
effect that changes in potential output have – owing to changes in the rate of inflation - 
on the real exchange rate and this, in turn, on aggregate demand. Second, there is a role 
for changes in income distribution. For example, Skott (1989) provides an extensive 
theoretical analysis of the role of income distribution as a self-adjustment mechanism3. 
Similarly, within the Marxian tradition, an increase in the rate of unemployment brings 
about a reduction in real wages which, in turn, increases the rate of profit and raises the 
rate of accumulation (Goodwin, 1967). Finally, there is also a role for (non-discretionary) 
fiscal policy through the effect of automatic stabilizers. This is because increases in the 
rate of unemployment and slow output growth usually prompt a rise in the government 
budget deficit which, in turn, increases aggregate demand and vice-versa. The current 
empirical relevance of these alternative mechanisms is extremely difficult to assess. 
However, we believe their relative relevance was probably higher in previous historical 
periods when CBs either did not exist or played a less prominent role in macroeconomic 
stabilization. Therefore, an implicit assumption of this study is that all these mechanisms 
currently play a less important role so the bulk of the adjustment of aggregate demand to 
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potential output actually occurs through the impact on aggregate demand of conventional 
monetary policy.            
 The purpose of this paper is to analyze the constraints conventional monetary 
policy is subject to when faced with the problem of generating a level of aggregate 
demand that keeps pace with a growing potential output. By conventional monetary 
policy we mean the regular actions that characterize the day-to-day setting of short-term 
interest rates by CBs with a view to achieving price stability. For that purpose, we set up 
a hypothesized economy represented by a simple model in which the CB uses short-term 
interest rates to hit an inflation target. Initially, the model is utilized to analyze the case of 
a closed economy without a government sector and, at a second phase, it is expanded to 
account for the case of an open economy with a government sector. Central to our 
discussion are two distinct analytical concepts; the ‘neutral’ interest rate and the ‘pseudo-
warranted’ interest rate. The former is defined in the usual way, i.e., the real interest rate 
that makes ex-ante saving at full employment equal to ex-ante investment. It is closely 
associated to the notion of the ‘liquidity trap’ (hereafter LT). The latter complements the 
former. We define it as the real rate of interest that yields a rate of growth of current 
output equal to the ‘natural’ rate of growth of output for a given level of capacity 
utilization and inflation rate. It is linked to the notion of the ‘growth trap’ (hereafter GT) 
to be explained subsequently. When the current level of capacity utilization equals the 
level desired by firms the ‘pseudo-warranted’ rate becomes the ‘warranted’ rate. Both the 
LT and the GT are defined below. These two concepts allow us to analyze under what 
conditions the CB will be able to stabilize the economy and to determine the size of the 
shocks that will push the economy into either a LT or a GT. This analysis is coupled with 
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a discussion over the type and size of shocks that will take the economy out of a LT and a 
GT.   
 According to us the main contributions of this study are the following. First, we 
provide a framework for the analysis of the ability of conventional monetary policy to 
take the economy down its potential output path in the absence of any self-regulating 
mechanism other than the (modest) stabilization provided by the foreign sector and 
(fiscal) automatic stabilizers. Second, we provide a formal definition of the concept of the 
LT that, we claim, helps clarifying recent discussions in the literature. Likewise, we coin 
the concept of the GT. It complements the notion of the LT and provides some insights 
into the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy. Third, we develop a simple 
theoretical model that allows us to explain the behavior of the ‘neutral’ real interest rate 
and the ‘pseudo-warranted’ real interest rate in the wake of different types of shocks. As 
some recent studies highlight, the former may undergo relatively large fluctuations thus 
undermining the effectiveness of conventional monetary policy4. Fourth, we analyze the 
contribution of the foreign and government sector to the effectiveness of the latter as the 
possible destabilizing nature of conventional monetary policy. Fifth, we determine the 
magnitude of changes in current real interest rates required to offset the impact of various 
types of shocks. Sixth, we identify several steady-state regimes depending on whether a 
rise in the target rate of inflation yields faster or slower output growth when the ‘natural’ 
rate of growth of output is not fully exogenous. Lastly, we propose a taxonomy of 
monetary policy regimes.  
 The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 below provides a background 
discussion on the topic. In particular, we discuss the way in which the adjustment of 
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aggregate demand to potential output is dealt with in mainstream macroeconomics. 
Section 3 presents a model for a closed economy without a government sector. The 
steady-state properties of the model are obtained and discussed. We also define the 
concepts of the ‘neutral’ and ‘pseudo-warranted’ interest rate as well as the associated 
ones of the LT and the GT. Next, we then analyze the behavior of the ‘neutral’ and 
‘pseudo-warranted’ interest rate in the aftermath of inflation and aggregate demand 
shocks. Section 4 replicates the analysis for the case of an open economy with a 
government sector. Section 5 presents a taxonomy of monetary policy regimes that builds 
on the results in sections 3 and 4. Finally, section 6 concludes.                       
 
2.- Some preliminary considerations 
 This section contains a background discussion on the self-adjustment mechanism 
that guarantees the adjustment of aggregate demand to potential output in the long run in 
modern macroeconomics. For that purpose, we present a general analytical framework in 
the context an imperfectly competitive economy. Then we show that this framework 
highlights some conceptual shortcomings in the treatment of this topic in the mainstream 
literature. In order to keep the discussion concrete we take Lindbeck (1992) as the most 
representative contribution to this subject. Second, we discuss some further aspects 
related to the literature on monetary policy rules.  
 
2.1.- Is the equilibrium rate of unemployment dynamically stable?  
 A general type of organizational framework for macroeconomic analysis that is 
shared by adherents to several schools of thought is represented by a labor market where 
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there is a price-setting curve (hereafter p-curve) and a wage-setting curve (hereafter w-
curve) drawn up in real wage-employment space. The p-curve implies a real 
wage/employment relationship that is derived from the price/output decisions of firms in 
the context of imperfect competition. The w-curve implies a real wage-employment 
relationship that may be based on a labor supply curve or, alternatively, may be derived 
from considerations of collective bargaining and/or efficiency wages. A possible real 
wage/employment relationship for each curve is drawn in Figure 1 below. We wish to 
make the following five considerations (see Sawyer, 1995 for an detailed presentation 
and discussion of this general framework). First, movements along the p-curve are 
generated by variations in the level of aggregate demand. Second, under imperfect 
competition there may be sections of the p-curve that are horizontal or even positively 
sloped. As pointed out in Sawyer (1995, p. 95), this arises from the possibility of 
(imperfectly competitive) firms operating along the decreasing portion of their cost 
curves and/or the mark-up varying inversely with the level of output. A crucial 
implication of this is that, in general, there is no reason why there should a negative 
relationship between the real wage and employment. Such a negative relationship only 
applies to the special (and much less relevant) case of perfect competition. Third, firms 
meet demand at the prices that they set so that there can not be excess demand for output 
along the p-curve. Fourth, an implication of the former is that the real wage is de facto set 
by the firms when determining the output price. As a result of it, the real wage is an 
endogenous variable and there is not a causal relationship running from the real wage to 
the level of employment at the aggregate level. Fifth, the wage and price dynamics 
implied by the combination of the p-curve and the w-curve do not necessarily take the 
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economy to its equilibrium rate of unemployment. The dynamics are shown in Figure 1 
below. We identify four different zones. In zone A nominal wages increase less (fall 
more) than expected prices and prices increase more (fall less) than expected nominal 
wages. In zone B nominal wages increase less (fall more) than expected prices and prices 
increase less (fall more) than expected nominal wages. In zone C nominal wages increase 
more (fall less) than expected prices and prices increase less (fall more) than expected 
nominal wages.          
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Figure 1: Price and wage inflation dynamics 
 
 Finally, in zone D nominal wages increase more (fall less) than expected prices 
and prices increase more (fall less) than expected nominal wages. It is clear from this that 
there will be a tendency for the real wage to converge to the equilibrium real wage  pw/ *
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only when the initial position of the economy is at zones A and C. By contrast, in zones B 
and D, the realized real wage may drift away from w  in the absence of an additional 
self-adjustment mechanism that is superimposed to the price and wage dynamics exposed 
above
p/ *
5. A detailed algebraic analysis of the stability of equilibrium point b in Figure 1 – 
corresponding to the equilibrium level of employment N* and the equilibrium real wage 
 - in the context of perfect competition is in Lindbeck (1992, 1993). The perfect 
competition assumption implies that the p-curve is downward-sloping. All the other 
elements remain the same as in the framework presented above. According to Lindbeck 
(1992, p. 220), dynamic stability requires that the real wage falls to the left, and rises to 
the right, of point b. He argues that this assumption is reasonable as wage inflation tends 
to rise when the rate of unemployment falls and price inflation tends to rise when there is 
higher excess demand in the product market. However, as pointed out above this does not 
guarantee per se that the economy converges to a point like b in Figure 1. Adding Phillips 
curve type wage and price dynamics (adjusted to account for the special case of perfect 
competition) he goes on to show algebraically that point b is a stable node
pw/ *
6 (Lindbeck, 
1993, Appendix B). The reduced-form equations of his model are as follows (for ease of 
comparison we use the same numbers as originally presented in Lindbeck, 1993): 
), Pω
), Pω
0p f
P&
                                                  (),( fPF ωωω ≡⋅=&                                          (B.3b) 
                                                                                           (B.4b) (),( gPGPP ω ≡⋅=&
where ω  is the real wage, P is the price level, , , ,  and f ω 0fP 0fgω 0pgP ω&  
and are time derivatives. The negative sign of  is justified on the basis that a higher 
real wage will (under perfect competition) reduce the actual level of employment and 
f ω
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this, in turn, will reduce the rate of growth of nominal wages for a given (expected) rate 
of price inflation. The positive sign of  is based on the assumption that a higher price 
level will reduce excess demand in the product market thus reducing the rate of inflation 
for a given (expected) rate of wage inflation. According to Lindbeck (1992), this occurs 
partly through the operation of the real balance effect and partly through changes in the 
degree of international competitiveness. He claims though that the latter effect is much 
more important than the former. The positive sign of  is due to the notion that a higher 
real wage will reduce the actual level of employment thus increasing the degree of excess 
demand in the product market. Finally, the negative sign of  is based on the argument 
that a higher price level will, through the channels mentioned above, reduce the degree of 
excess demand in the product market. Thus, equilibrium point b of the static system is a 
stable node iff: 
f P
gω
g P
f
∂
∂
ω
0f
P
g −∂
∂
ω∂
0p
                                                              0p
P
g
∂
∂+                                                    (B.5) 
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∂
∂⋅∂
∂⋅∂
∂
ωω                                             (B.6) 
At this juncture, the author argues that this will be the case under the assumption 
that each of the own-market effects on real wages and prices ( ω∂∂ /f  and ) is 
large relative to the cross-market effects (
Pg ∂∂ /
Pf ∂∂ /  and ∂/g ) (Lindbeck, 1993, p.177). 
However, as highlighted above, / ω∂∂f  will only be necessarily the case under perfect 
competition so that B.5 may or may not hold. Likewise, B.6 only holds if 0p/ ω∂∂N and 
this, again, will only be necessarily the case under perfect competition7. In an imperfectly 
competitive economy B.5 and, particularly B.6, may not hold and, as a result of it, point b 
may not be a stable node. For instance, if B.6 does not hold - and this will certainly be the 
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case if equilibrium point b happens to be either on an upward-sloping or on a horizontal 
section of the p-curve - then the former will be a saddle-point and its dynamic stability 
will depend on the initial position of the system8. More generally, and as stressed in the 
discussion above, real wages are effectively set by firms and this undermines the practical 
relevance of a theory where exogenous variations in the real wage clear the labor market.  
 
2.2.- Macroeconomic stabilization and monetary policy      
The equilibrium condition in the goods market for an open economy with a 
government sector when current output equals potential output is: 
                                           )()()()( rNXTrGrIYrs p +−+=                                         (1) 
where s is the saving ratio, Y p is potential output, I is the (gross) level of investment, G is 
government spending, T is government revenue and NX is net exports. The real interest 
rate that results from (4) is the ‘neutral’ real interest rate or rn , i.e., the interest rate that 
makes ex-ante saving at potential output equal to the sum of ex-ante gross investment, the 
government budget deficit and the foreign sector current account balance. It is better 
thought of as a medium-term interest rate. If Y p  is the level of output that keeps inflation 
constant in the absence of inflation shocks (hereafter ISs) we have that inflation will rise 
(fall) when rr (np rr ). This is the Wicksellian approach to inflation dynamics 
(Wicksell, 1936). As a result, 
nf
rn  represents a critical benchmark for the setting of interest 
rates.  
As pointed out in the introduction, we believe that the most important regulation 
mechanism at work in modern economies comes in the form of a CB who brings about 
changes in real interest rates so as to achieve its ultimate policy objectives. The most 
 12
important objective of modern CBs as far as macroeconomic stabilization is concerned is 
price stability. However, CBs can only control the path of short-term nominal interest 
rates. As long as nominal interest rates remain above the zero lower bound the CB will 
also be able to move real interest rates in the desired direction. In turn, if the level of 
aggregate demand is a negative function of the real interest rate then the CB can, under 
normal circumstances, manipulate real interest rates so as to generate a rate of expansion 
of aggregate demand that matches a growing potential output. Let us present the 
following simple model: 
                                                          )(1 rrf
n−=π&                                                          (2)    
                                                                                                           (3) )(2 ππ dn frr −=−
Substituting (3) into (2) yields: 
                                                                                                                 (4) )(3 πππ df −=&
where , , , 0'1 pf 0'2 ff 0'3 pf π  is the inflation rate, π d  is the target inflation rate and r 
is the current real interest rate. Differential equation (2) shows the dynamics of inflation 
in a Wicksellian fashion. Equation (3) is a Taylor-like monetary policy rule. It can be 
seen that – since  - the rate of inflation will converge to 0'3 pf π d  in the long run. Thus 
as long as the CB interest rate rule is governed by (3), monetary policy will succeed in 
hitting the inflation target. Needles to say, CBs face a good deal of difficulties when 
implementing a rule like (3). A first problem is how to set nominal interest rates in order 
to push ex-ante current real interest rates in a given direction and by a certain magnitude. 
This is because there is some degree of uncertainty as to the rate of inflation expected by 
the public. A second and more important problem stems from the fact that CBs do not 
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actually know the value of rn . Nevertheless, there may be circumstances when, even if a 
CB knows both the value of rn  and the rate of inflation expected by the public, it may not 
be able to vary real interest rates as indicated by expression (3) above. If so the economy 
may stagnate. This will occur when the CB needs to yield a negative real rate of interest 
to stimulate aggregate demand but it can’t do so because the nominal interest rate is 
already at the zero lower bound. This situation is usually referred to as a LT9.  
 A number of authors has recently analyzed the causes of the existence of a zero 
lower bound on nominal interest rates as well as the policy options that will minimize the 
probability that the zero lower bound becomes a binding constraint on monetary policy 
and remove this constraint in case the economy gets into a LT. It is not our purpose to 
review this literature. However, we can safely highlight two points on which there seems 
to be an emerging consensus. First, the existence of a zero lower bound on nominal 
interest rates can, as a minimum, engender a moderate deterioration in macroeconomic 
stability as the inflation target approaches zero and therefore it is an important constraint 
on how conventional monetary policy can operate in a low inflation environment (Fuhrer 
and Madigan, 1997; Reifschneider and Williams, 2000; Mussa, 2000). Second, CBs 
should set a low and positive inflation target (let’s say 2 per cent). Conversely, there is no 
emerging consensus on whether unconventional monetary policy options can take the 
economy out of a LT should it be necessary. Several authors have proposed a number of 
different policy options for a CB to deal with the zero lower bound. More important for 
our discussion, they suggest that these options or a suitable combination of them will 
push the economy out of a LT if needed. These options include setting a carry tax on 
currency and vault cash as well as on electronic reserves, open market operations on 
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long-term bonds, foreign exchange intervention and price-level targeting (Goodfriend, 
2000; Buiter, 2003; Ito and Mishkin, 2004). By contrast a different set of authors remains 
skeptical about the power of unconventional monetary policy to spur activity through any 
channel when nominal interest rates are at zero10 (Freedman, 2000; Blinder, 2000; Mussa, 
2000).            
 
3.- The case of a closed economy without a government sector 
 This section considers the case of a closed economy without a government sector. 
We consider a one-sector economy with two inputs, labor and capital and we assume that 
the production function has fixed coefficients. Potential output Y p  is determined by: 
                                              KvNY p ⋅≤⋅= λ                                                     (5) 
where N  is the level of employment that keeps the rate of inflation constant and λ  and v 
are respectively the productivity of labor and capital when the factors are fully utilized. 
The current rate of capacity utilization is: 
                                                            1≤⋅= Kv
Yϕ                                                           (6) 
We assume that firms have a desired rate of capacity utilization 1pϕ  so they 
expand capacity when ϕϕ f  and stop expanding capacity when ϕϕ p 11. As a result, 
the desired rate of capacity utilization when YY p=  is12: 
                                                    1≤⋅==
K
N
vvK
Y p λϕ                                                      (7) 
We denote by e  the employment ratio corresponding to the non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU) and by L the total labor force. For simplicity, 
we assume that e  is constant. Hence, we have that: 
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                                                                LeN ⋅=                                                            (8) 
 In turn, the dynamics of the rate of inflation are given by: 
                                                             )( ee −= ξπ&                                                (9) 0' fξ
Since we are concerned with the case of a closed economy without a government 
sector, expression (1) now becomes: 
                                                    IYs p =⋅                                                           (10) 
If we divide through (10) by the capital stock K and denote the rate of capital 
accumulation by g and the rate of depreciation of physical capital by ψ  we get: 
                                                ψ+=⋅ g
K
Ys
p
                                                      (11) 
and inserting (7) into (11) yields: 
                                                         ψϕ +=⋅⋅ gvs                                                        (12) 
The actual real wage w/p is determined by firms’ profit-maximization objectives 
so that:  
                                                   mp
w λ=                                                          (13) 
where  is one plus the (average) mark-up. If we assume that the average mark-up 
set by (imperfectly competitive) firms is constant, then the joint assumption of a fixed 
coefficients technology and a constant mark-up implies that the p-curve is horizontal in 
real wage-employment space so that condition B.6 in Lindbeck’s model above does not 
hold in this case. The ‘natural’ rate of growth of output is: 
1fm
                                                               algn +=                                                           (14) 
where l and a  are respectively the growth rate of labor force and labor productivity.   
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We now turn our attention to functions s and g. We assume that the saving ratio s 
is a function of the rate of inflation π , the rate of growth of output , the real interest 
rate r and a measure of exogenous shocks 
yˆ
ε s  or:  
                                               ),,ˆ,( επ sryss =                                                     (15) 
where , ,  and 0ˆ fsy 0psπ 0≥sr ε s  is a stochastic variable with zero mean. The positive 
sign of  is based on the life cycle hypothesis of saving. The latter establishes a positive 
relationship between s and  in the short and the long run (Modigliani and Brumberg, 
1980; Modigliani, 1986). The non-negativity of s  is due to the fact that although 
households are, on average, net lenders and substitution and income effects move in 
opposite directions for individual households who are net lenders, yet wealth effects 
operate in the same direction as the substitution effect thus making  a very unlikely 
scenario. The sign of  requires some clarification. In a study of the US economy by 
Pollin (1985), the author shows that the stability of the total outstanding debt ratio  of 
the economy’s non-financial sectors has displayed essentially no trend throughout the 
post-World War II period. Using the formula  derived in Gurley and 
Shaw (1957) where  is the marginal propensity of the aggregate non-financial sector to 
issue net new debt and 
s yˆ
yˆ
sπ
r
h=
0psr
St
YYS tt ˆ/)ˆ1( +
ht
Yˆ  is the rate of growth of nominal GNP, the author argues that the 
stability of  throughout the postwar period, and especially since the 1960’s, has 
resulted from rising trends for 
St
Yˆ  and  as well as a declining trend for the rate of 
growth of real GNP. As a result, the ratio  has fallen correspondingly over this 
period and  has risen along with y in order for  to remain constant. According to 
ht
( Y/)Yˆ1+ ˆ
Stht
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Pollin (1985), the divergent patterns of and  are due to the asymmetric impact of 
inflation on the two ratios. As for , its numerator, the stock of debt, remains fixed in 
nominal terms regardless of variations in the price level (relative to trend) whereas its 
denominator, nominal GNP, varies in nominal terms directly with the price level. As a 
result, in an inflationary environment, the nominal value of the debt stock remains fixed 
while GNP rises, so that  is biased downwards. Conversely, with , current-period 
flow values are in both numerator and denominator, and thus the impact of inflation on 
the ratio is neutral. Because of this asymmetry, an increasing reliance on debt by the non-
financial sectors, i.e. a rising  may not engender increases in their debt burdens.  
St
t
ht
St
π
St ht
ht
Next, we have that for a given h  a fall in the rate of inflation will increase net 
borrowers’ real debt burden and vice-versa13. In turn, this will increase the general level 
of bankruptcy risk. In the case of net borrower households the increase in the real level of 
indebtedness will lead to a fall in consumption (Bernanke, 1981). In the meantime, the 
increase in net borrowers’ real debt burden will be coupled by a rise in net lenders’ real 
financial wealth and, for the same reason, this will tend to increase net lender households 
consumption demand. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that net borrowers’ 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is, on average, higher than net lenders’. In 
addition, bankruptcy imposes net social costs so that, as the general level of bankruptcy 
rises (owing to rising real debt burdens by net borrowers), the level of spending of net 
lenders will rise by less than the fall in the level of spending by net borrowers. Hence we 
assume that . The size of  will be directly proportional to the size of the debt 
ratio and to the degree of dispersion of balance sheet positions across households
0psπ s
14. Next, 
we define the rate of capital accumulation, g as: 
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                                              ),,ˆ,( επ grygg =                                                    (16) 
where , ,  and 0fgπ 0ˆ fg y 0pgr ε g  is a stochastic variable with zero mean which  
captures exogenous shocks to g. The positive sign of  stems from the same 
considerations made above as to the likely stabilizing effect of inflation on consumption 
demand
gπ
g
15. Since firms’ are on average, net borrowers a rise in the rate of inflation will, 
on average, reduce firms’ debt burden in real terms and vice-versa. In turn, this will 
stimulate investment (Bernanke, 1981; Caskey and Fazzari, 1987; Greenwald and 
Stiglitz, 1993b). The size of  is determined by the same factors affecting the size of 
. The negative sign of  reflects conventional cost of capital as well as access to 
(external) finance considerations. Finally, the positive sign of  reflects the accelerator 
effect for a desired rate of capacity utilization 
gπ
grsπ
yˆ
1pϕ . In steady growth, we have that 
 but  may be either above or below one when the economy is not in steady 
growth. Therefore, expression (12) can be formulated as: 
1=ˆg y g yˆ
                             ψεπϕεπ +=⋅⋅ ),,ˆ,(),,ˆ,( gs rygvrys                                     (17) 
 
3.1.- Steady-state analysis  
 In steady growth we have that gy n=ˆ , ϕϕ =  and 0==εε gs  so that expression 
(17) above can be split into the following two equations: 
                                                          grgg nn =),,(π                                                      (18) 
and                                             ψϕπ +=⋅⋅ gvrgs nn ),,(                                              (19) 
 Equation (18) tells us that in steady growth the rate of accumulation must equal 
the ‘natural’ rate of growth as long as ϕϕ = . Equation (19) represents the equilibrium 
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condition in the goods market when YY p= . Thus we have a system of two equations and 
two unknowns π *  and r* . In order to get explicit solutions for π *  and r*  we need to 
assume that functions s and g adopt a linear form so that in steady growth (18) and (19) 
become: 
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where s  and g  are the exogenous components of s and g respectively. Recalling that in 
steady growth , we can obtain explicit solutions for 1= π *  and r*  by solving the 
system of two linear equations made up by (20) and (21) or: 
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 The expression for the steady-state ‘neutral’ real interest rate above shows that it 
is independent of the ‘natural’ rate of growth of output and that, instead, it is determined 
by all the factors embedded in g  and by the steady-state rate of inflation16. As for π * , we 
can see that its sign is ambiguous. Further, and more important, it is clear that there exists 
a steady-state inflation rate π *  which differs from the inflation target π d . To fix ideas, 
the model suggests that if and only if  is exogenously determined, the CB can do 
nothing to affect the rate of inflation in the long run and that, as a result of it, there is no 
reason why the CB should be held accountable for the behavior of inflation. No wonder, 
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this result runs against most propositions in mainstream monetary theory. Nevertheless, 
our results can be reconciled with conventional wisdom in the field by dropping the 
assumption that  is fully exogenous. For instance, we may assume that the rate of 
technical progress is demand-pull so that its rate of change exhibits some degree of 
endogeneity, i.e., it rises when the rate of growth of output increases and vice-versa
gn
17 
(Schmookler, 1966; Brouwer and Kleinknecht, 1999; Geroski and Walters, 1995). As a 
result, we can express the ‘natural’ rate of growth as: 


=
s
                                                                                                                 (22) ygg exnn ˆ⋅+= γ
where  is the exogenous component of  and 00fgexn gn 1pp γ .  
 If we set the steady-state rate of inflation equal to target inflation π d , insert (22) 
and π d  into (20) and (21) and rearrange, we get respectively the rate of growth of output 
and the ‘neutral’ real interest rate in steady growth or: 
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Thus, the latter is a positive function of π d as long as 0fπ d
s yˆ
. This result runs 
against the notion of a steady-state neutral interest rate that is exclusively determined by 
‘real forces’ that pervades most discussions of this topic in the literature18. Furthermore, 
since the denominator in is positive for plausible values of v and , we get:  yˆ*
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 Hence, we can’t say a priori whether or not an increase in π d  will result in an 
increase in . However, we know that an increase in yˆ* π d  will lead to an increase in r*  as 
long as 0fπ d
/ˆ* dy
. This is because an increase in the steady-state rate of inflation will, since 
 and , increase the level of aggregate demand. The ambiguous result in (23) 
suggests the existence of several different regimes in steady growth. A first regime 
corresponds to the case when  and we refer to it as the ‘inflation-led growth’ 
regime. A second regime corresponds to the case when  and we refer to it as 
the ‘disinflation-led growth’ regime. A third and last regime corresponds to the case 
when  and we can refer to it as the ‘inflation-neutral growth’ regime. Their 
basic properties are summarized in Table 1 below. The significance of these regimes is 
that a rise in 
0psπ
∂
0f
0=
gπ
∂π
0/ˆ* fπ dy ∂∂
0/ˆ* pπ dy ∂∂
π d  will lead to an increase in r*  thus making the economy less vulnerable 
to shocks that may push it into a LT. Yet, in the case of the ‘disinflation-led growth’ 
regime, the rise in r*  will come at the expense of a lower . In this case, the CB will 
face a trade-off. The notion of the existence of several different regimes in steady growth 
stems from the joint assumption that: (i) the ‘natural’ rate of growth exhibits some degree 
of endogeneity and (ii) that increases (decreases) in the rate of inflation lead to a rise 
(fall) in aggregate demand owing to the balance sheet considerations discussed above. 
yˆ*
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Arguably, these effects may be weak. In addition, they may only be relevant as long as 
inflation remains within moderate levels (let’s say below 10 per cent). As inflation 
reaches higher levels, it may well have large adverse supply-side effects which offset any 
favorable demand-side effect on economic growth. 
 
3.2.- The behavior of the economy in the short run and the growth trap 
 We now focus on the behavior of the economy in the short run. The equilibrium 
condition in the goods market is: 
                              ψπϕπ ππ ++++=⋅+++ rggyggvrssyss ryry ˆ)ˆ( ˆˆ                   (25) 
and, as a result, the rate of growth of output is: 
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 If we assume, for consistency purposes, that 0ˆˆ fgvs yy −ϕ , we have that: 
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 We may justify the assumption that 0ˆˆ fgvs yy −ϕ  by arguing that  is much 
higher than  in the short run owing to the presence of relatively large decision and 
execution lags in investment. Rearranging (25), we can obtain the expression for the real 
rate of interest that clears the goods market when 
s yˆ
g yˆ
0ˆ =y  and gy n=ˆ or: 
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Expression (29) corresponds to point A Figure 2 below. We can think of rg n  as a 
pseudo-warranted real rate of interest in the sense of being the rate of interest that makes 
 for a given gy n=ˆ ϕ , π  and . Of course, the warranted real rate of interest g yˆ r  will 
be the rate of interest that makes 
g nϕϕ=
gy n=ˆ  when ϕϕ =  and 1ˆ =g y . Therefore, the 
difference between the ‘warranted’ rate and the steady-state ‘neutral’ rate is that in the 
former it will generally be the case that ππ ≠ * . Similarly, when 0=r  we obtain point B 
in Figure 2 or: 
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The determination of rg n  is graphically illustrated in Figure 2 below. We measure 
the real interest rate r in the vertical axis and the rate of growth of output  in the 
horizontal one. The line denoting the rate of growth of output for every value of the real 
rate of interest is downward-sloping under the assumption that (27) holds. We refer to it 
as the dynamic aggregate demand line or DAD line. In general it will not be a line owing 
to the presence of 
yˆ
ϕ  and π  in expression (26) above. We will impose the assumption of 
linearity for presentational purposes. Its position is determined by the current inflation 
rate. Under the assumption that ∂ 0/ fπ∂rg n  an increase in the current rate of inflation 
from π 0  to π 1  will shift the DAD line upward from DAD0 to DAD1 thereby leading to a 
rise in rg n . This will certainly be the case in a closed economy without a government 
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sector as expression (35) below shows. However, it may not be the case in an open 
economy with a government sector19. 
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Figure 2: The determination of the pseudo-warranted real rate of interest 
                 
 If we now denote by ω  the minimum (ex-ante) real interest rate that the CB can 
actually set, we can define a GT as a situation where: 
                                                    ωprg n                                                             (32)    
If we further assume that the minimum nominal interest rate the CB can set is zero 
and that the expected rate of inflation is roughly equal to the current rate of inflation, we 
have that20: 
                                                  πππω −=−=−= ee0                                                   (33)                              
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 As a result, we say that an economy is in a GT whenever: 
                                                π−prg n    or   0pπ+rg n                                               (34) 
where                                      0
)( fϕ
ϕ
π
ππ
vsg
vsgr
rr
g n
−
−−=∂
∂                                                (35)           
 Therefore, an IS will lead the economy into a GT if21:  
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where π 0  and  are the initial inflation rate and rg n0 rg n  respectively. We may wonder how 
the output-gap will vary when the economy gets into a GT. There are two possibilities. If 
 is fully exogenous, then the economy will exhibit either a rapidly narrowing positive 
output-gap or a rapidly widening negative one. By contrast, if  exhibits some degree of 
endogeneity, the positive (negative) output-gap will admittedly narrow (widen) at a lower 
pace. The latter will depend negatively on the degree of endogeneity exhibited by . In 
turn, the behavior of when the economy is in a GT ultimately depends on the behavior 
of the rate of inflation. In a closed economy without a government sector, the faster it 
falls, the deeper the slump will be as a result of the impact of a falling rate of inflation on 
the real interest rate. Next, the variation of 
gn
gn
gn
y*
rg n  resulting from a change in the current rate 
of capacity utilization has an ambiguous sign since: 
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 As a result, an (unfavorable) aggregate demand shock (hereafter DS) will lead the 
economy into a GT if: 
 26
                                                      000 pϕπ ∂
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where  is the initial pseudo-warranted real rate of interest. Thus, expression (35) tells 
us that ISs will lead to changes in 
rg n0
rg n  of the same sign as the initial shock whereas 
expression (37) tells us that the impact on rg n  of DSs is ambiguous. We will return to this 
point in sections 4 and 5 below.   
 
3.3.- The behavior of the ‘neutral’ interest rate and the liquidity trap 
A LT is usually defined as a situation in which conventional monetary policies 
have become impotent because nominal interest rates are at or near zero. In turn, this will 
be the case ‘when desired saving exceeds desired investment at full employment, even at 
a zero short-term interest rate’ (Krugman, 1998, p.171). One way of thinking of a LT is to 
define it as a situation in which ω≤rn . If we assume again that the minimum nominal 
interest rate that the CB can set is zero and that the expected rate of inflation is equal to 
the current rate of inflation we will say that an economy has got into a LT if22: 
               π−≤rn       or      0≤+πrn                                            (39) 
 Expression (39) above tells us that the lower rn  and π  are, the more likely it is 
that the economy gets into a LT in the aftermath of either a favorable IS or an 
unfavorable DS. This suggests that, in the context of a closed economy without a 
government sector, the setting of an inflation target well above zero reduces the 
probability of getting into a LT. However, expression (39) also suggests that the focus on 
(too) low inflation targets as the single cause of an economy falling into a LT misses the 
fact that a negative rn  is as problematic as the setting of a very low inflation target.  
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Conventional wisdom regarding the LT seems to be that the latter may arise under certain 
(exceptional) circumstances as a result of various types of large shocks. For instance, if 
the rate of inflation is already very close to zero, then either a large favorable IS or a 
large unfavorable DS may push the rate of inflation below zero. Since the nominal 
interest rate may already be very close to the zero lower bound, the CB may be unable to 
push real interest rates down. The dominant view is that this is a very unlikely scenario as 
long as target (measured) inflation lies at or above 2 per cent23 (De Long, 1999). Yet the 
literature on the LT tends to sidestep the fact that at least in theory the economy may get 
into a LT even if the rate of inflation is positive. As condition (39) above shows, it is not 
only the rate of inflation that matters. If 0prn  the economy may be technically in a LT 
even if the rate of inflation is well above zero. Finally, expression (39) above suggests 
that a way out of a LT is, as suggested initially in Krugman (1998) and more recently in 
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), the creation of inflationary expectations. However, 
insofar as the expected rate of inflation tracks the current rate of inflation, there is no way 
the CB can overcome the so-called ‘inverted credibility’ problem24. We believe CBs can 
only raise inflationary expectations by generating inflation but they cannot generate it as 
long as the economy is in a LT. Hence, in the absence of effective unconventional 
monetary policy options, only discretionary fiscal policy (especially when financed 
through money creation) can do the job of taking the economy out of a LT. 
  
3.3.1.- Inflation shocks 
We turn to the analysis of the behavior of rn  in the aftermath of ISs and to the 
analysis of the conditions that will push the economy into a LT. It is clear from (17) 
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above that rn  is a function of both π  and . Its explicit solution can be obtained from 
(25) by making 
yˆ
ϕϕ = . However, we are here interested in determining how it varies in 
response to various types of shocks. Differentiating (17) and rearranging we obtain: 
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If we initially assume that 0d , we have that (40) becomes: 
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As long as condition (39) does not hold, if the CB seeks to offset an IS through 
changes in interest rates, the minimum size of the variation in the current real interest rate 
required to offset the shock is: 
                                         πdrndr ⋅Π+− 00                                                (42) 
where  and  are respectively the initial value of the neutral and current real interest 
rate. Since , a first result is that ISs per se induce changes of 
rn0 r0
0 f 0 rn  in the same 
direction as the rate of inflation. Insofar as the CB needs to lower (raise) current real 
interest rates following a fall (rise) in the current rate of inflation rn  will tend to move in 
a destabilizing fashion. As a result, any given CB-induced change in current real interest 
rates will be less effective in affecting output and inflation than if rn
p
 remained constant. 
If we retrieve expression (39) above we may conclude that in the absence of changes in 
 the economy will fall into a LT in the wake of a favorable IS (yˆ 0πd ) if: 
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It is clear from this that in the absence of changes in  and for given values of yˆ π 0  
and , the likelihood that the economy gets into a LT depends on the magnitude of the 
initial IS (
rn0
πd ) and the size of . For a given Π0 πd , the larger Π0 is the more likely it is 
that the economy will get into a LT following a favorable IS. Under an inflation-targeting 
regime an IS will tend to trigger a monetary policy response by the CB. Thus, we need to 
specify how current real interest rates will vary in the aftermath of changes in the 
(current) rate of inflation. We assume that, as long as inflation remains positive, the CB 
raises real interest when inflation rises and vice-versa. Conversely, when inflation 
becomes zero or negative, real interest rates will fall (rise) whenever inflation rises 
(falls)25. If we further assume that the response of the CB occurs before the economy gets 
into a LT, we have that: 
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 Finally, if we assume that a rise (fall) in the current real interest rate has a 
negative (positive) effect on output growth in the short run and only inflation in the long 
run, we have that 0/ˆ pφ=dryd . Inserting φ  and (44) into (40), we obtain26: 
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Hence, the minimum size of the variation in the current real interest rate required 
to offset the IS is: 
                                         πdrrndr ⋅Π+− 100 )(f                                                (46) 
and, therefore, expression (43) becomes: 
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 where the sign of Π  is ambiguous. Looking at (47) above we have that, if Π , the 
rise (fall) in  brought about by a fall (rise) in the (current) real interest rate will 
reinforce the direct effect on 
1 Π01 f
yˆ
rn  of the fall (rise) in the rate of inflation so that it will 
become more likely that a favorable IS leads the economy into a LT. If , the 
CB-induced rise (fall) in  will offset either partially or fully the impact on 
ΠΠ 01 p≤0
yˆ rn  of the 
initial fall (rise) in the rate of inflation. Finally, if  the CB-induced increase (fall) 
in  will more than offset the impact on 
01 pΠ
yˆ rn  caused by the fall (rise) in the rate of 
inflation. This latter case is the most favorable one for those authors who argue that a LT 
is a very unlikely scenario. We can also think of this case as the most favorable scenario 
for a CB since favorable ISs will lead to a rise in rn  and vice-versa thereby enhancing the 
stabilizing power of the CB. Indeed, if Π1  is negative, it may be the case that the CB 
does not need to vary real interest rates at all to safely head the economy towards its 
potential output time-path. This is because rn  would then forcefully move in the opposite 
direction to the rate of inflation, i.e., the behavior of rn  would make the economy largely 
self-stabilizing. In the opposite extreme, if Π1  is positive and large enough, rn  will move 
in the same direction as the rate of inflation and, as a result, the CB may be unable to 
stabilize the economy owing to the large variations of rn  in response to ISs. This second 
case resembles Harrod’s knife-edge instability model (Harrod, 1939) except for the fact 
that instability in Harrod’s model is two-sided but is only one-sided here. Thus, one way 
of addressing the existence of unstable growth paths in the economy is to analyze the 
behavior of the ‘neutral’ real rate of interest. Returning to expression (45) above, when 
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0fπ  we have that 0fδ . As a result, rn  will move in the most destabilizing fashion 
when: 
s yˆ
ππ sg −
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0≤π 0pδ
                                               ϕvg yˆ p                                                             (48)             
Hence, a second result is that an economy’s ability to forestall the occurrence of a 
LT in the aftermath of ISs and, more generally, its ability to self-stabilize depends 
critically on the sign of (48) as well as on its size relative to the size of ISs and the term 
ϕv . Further, since the magnitude of δ  when 0fπ  is determined de facto by the 
CB, we have that, in our hypothesized economy, the CB-induced pro-cyclical behavior of 
real interest rates will prove destabilizing – in the sense of leading to a fall in rn  when 
inflation falls and vice-versa - when condition (48) holds but will prove stabilizing 
otherwise, i.e., when . Since the CB does not know a priori the sign let alone the 
magnitude of (48), it will be sensible to change interest rates cautiously and at a speed 
that is inversely proportional to the degree of uncertainty about the sign and magnitude of 
(48). This result is reminiscent of Brainard’s principle (Brainard, 1967). What are the 
chances that the economy escapes from a LT if favorable DSs are not forthcoming?. If 
Π0
, we have that  and any further favorable IS will raise rn  provided Π . 
However, as (47) above shows, this will not be enough for the economy to get out of a 
LT. As a result, once the economy gets into a LT, either large unfavorable ISs or, 
alternatively, large favorable DSs will be required to push it out of it.  
01 p
 
3.3.2.- Aggregate demand shocks 
In a closed economy without a government sector, DSs initially affect either s or g 
and, therefore rn  before affecting . We restrict the analysis to the case of shocks hitting yˆ
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the rate of capital accumulation, g ( 0≠ε g ). Notwithstanding, results are qualitatively 
similar for shocks affecting the saving ratio s. If we differentiate (17) and rearrange, we 
get:  
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where is the partial derivative of g with respect to shock gε ε g . If we initially assume 
that d 0ˆ =y/ dπ , we obtain: 
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Expression (50) tells us that the impact on rn  of a shock to g when 0ˆ/ =yddπ  
depends on the sign of . Since the denominator in Π2 Π2  is positive, its sign ultimately 
depends on the sign and magnitude of (48) above. Next, if (39) does not hold, then the 
minimum size of the variation in the current real interest rate required to offset the DS is: 
                                          dr ε g⋅Π+ 20)                                                (51) 
In turn, the economy will fall into a LT in the aftermath of an adverse shock 
( ) if: 0pε g
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More generally, the behavior of rn  will prove destabilizing when  and 
vice-versa. In contrast to the case of ISs, when condition (48) holds, the destabilizing 
nature of DSs is mitigated rather than accentuated. However, as long as  we 
02 fΠ
0/ˆ fdgyd
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have that, whether or not condition (48) holds, it is unlikely that  so that, as long 
as 
02 pΠ
0ˆ/ =yddπ , DSs will tend to prove destabilizing in the sense used in this study. In any 
case, if we compare expressions (43) and (47) on the one hand and expression (52) on the 
other hand, it can be seen that, for the same magnitude of shocks, π 0 ,  and model 
parameters values (and even if d
rn0
0ˆ/ fydπ ), the question whether or not ISs are more 
likely than DSs to lead the economy into a LT ultimately hinges on the magnitude of the 
(direct) impact of the latter on rn , e.g., on the size of . The larger the (direct) impact 
on 
gε
rn  is, the more likely it is that DSs will prove relatively more destabilizing than ISs in 
terms of the chances of leading the economy into a LT. Next, if 0ˆ/ ≠yddπ  we have that:    
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where Π  
In  above, the sign of the first term in the inner bracket of the numerator is 
ambiguous. This is because inflation rises when Y and vice-versa and, as a result, 
the sign of d
f
ydˆ/  is uncertain. If d 0ˆ/ fydπ , the behavior of the rate of inflation will tend 
to reinforce the destabilizing impact on rn  of a shock to g. Further, if (39) does not hold, 
the minimum size of the variation in the current real interest rate required to offset the 
shock to g is: 
                                          dr εn rr ⋅Π+− 300 )(f                                                (54) 
and the economy will get into a LT if: 
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Therefore, we have that the higher Π2  and Π3  are, the more likely it is that an 
unfavorable DS leads the economy into a LT and that a favorable DS pushes the 
economy out of it.   
 
4.- The case of an open economy with a government sector 
 This section replicates the analysis in section 3.1 above for the case of an open 
economy with a government sector. As in section 3, we first obtain the steady-state 
properties of the model and then analyze the behavior of rg n  and rn  in the short run. In 
addition, we analyze and discuss the contribution of the foreign and government sector to 
monetary policy’s stabilization capacity. If we divide expression (1) through by the 
capital stock K we get: 
                                                     xfg
K
Y p +++=⋅ ψs                                                 (56) 
where f is the ratio of the government budget deficit to capital and x is the ratio of net 
exports to capital. We assume that f and x are given by: 
                           ),,ˆ( ε fryff =                  and              ),,ˆ,( επ xryxx =  
where , , , , , , 0  and 0ˆ pf y 0ff r 0ff ε 0 0ˆ pxypxπ 0 fxεpxr ε f  and ε x  are random 
shocks with zero mean to f and x respectively. The negative sign of  and the positive 
sign of  stem from the fact that higher output growth raises government revenue and 
thus lowers the government budget deficit for a given level of government spending 
whereas higher real interest rates increase interest payments by the government to holders 
of government debt and thus increases the budget deficit. The negative sign of  is due 
to the negative impact on net exports of a fall in the level of international competitiveness 
f yˆ
f r
xπ
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following an increase in π  relative to the rate of inflation prevailing in other trading 
economies27. The negative sign of  results from the fact that a higher  will lead to an 
increase in imports relative to exports other things being equal. Finally, the negative sign 
of  is due to the currency real appreciation – and the resulting adverse impact on net 
exports - that stems from higher real interest rates. If we assume that the rest of partial 
derivatives in s and g have the same sign as in section 3, we can rewrite (56) above as: 
xyˆ yˆ
xr
,ε,(π rgv ⋅⋅
vsr
=εx
g
gn −, ϕ
g yˆ
xrv⋅)
1=
− (
                      ),ˆ,(),,ˆ(),,ˆ),,ˆ,( πεψεϕεπ xfgs yxryfryrys +++=             (57) 
and we further need to assume that: 
                                                    fxg rrr f++− ϕ                                                (58) 
4.1.- Steady-state analysis  
In steady growth we have that gy n=ˆ , ϕϕ =  and 0=== εεε fgs  so that (57) 
above can be split into: 
                                                          grg nn =),,(π                                                    (18b) 
and                           grgxrgfvrs nnn =−−⋅⋅ ),,(),(),( πψπ                           (59) 
 Hence, we have a system of two equations and two unknowns. In order to get 
explicit solutions for π *  and r*  we make the same simplifying assumptions as in section 
3 and assume that functions s, g, f and x adopt a linear form. Hence, in steady growth 
(18b) and (59) become respectively: 
                                                  grgggg nrn =+++ ππ                                         (21b) 
         grgxxxrfgffrssgss nnyrnyrny =+++−++−+++ )() ˆˆˆ πψϕπ ππ(     (60)                  
Recalling that  in steady growth and solving the system made up by (21b) 
and (60) yields: 
ˆg y
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 Looking at π *  above we have that, since the sign of both the denominator and the 
numerator is ambiguous, we can not reach any conclusion as to its sign. As for r*
n
 all the 
considerations made for the case of a closed economy without a government sector carry 
over to the current context. As before, we may drop the assumption that  is fully 
exogenous and hence allow for the existence of a long-run rate of inflation 
g
π d  that is set 
by the CB. If we assume that  is given by expression (22) above, insert (22) and gn π d  
into (60) and (21b) and rearrange, we have the steady-state neutral real interest rate is the 
same as in section 3 and, in addition, we have that: 
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210*ˆ π++=                                where 
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Features 
)0( fπ d  
Closed economy 
without 
government sector 
Open economy 
with government 
sector 
Inflation-led 
growth regime 
0/ˆ* fπ dy ∂∂  
0/* fπ dr ∂∂  s
g
s
g
r
rp
π
π  0
3
2 f
B
B  
Disinflation-led 
growth regime 
0/ˆ* pπ dy ∂∂  
0/* fπ dr ∂∂  s
g
s
g
r
rf
π
π  0
3
2 p
B
B  
Inflation-neutral 
growth regime 
0/ˆ* =∂∂ π dy  
     0/* fπ dr ∂∂  
         
s
g
s
g
r
r=
π
π            0
3
2 =
B
B  
Table 1: Monetary policy regimes in steady growth 
 
Since the sign of and  is ambiguous, and as in section 3, we have that the 
impact on of a variation in 
B2 B3
yˆ* π d  is uncertain whereas an increase in the latter will lead 
to an increase in r*  as long as 0fπ d . Therefore, as I section 3 we can distinguish 
between an ‘inflation-led growth’ regime, a ‘disinflation-led growth’ regime and an 
‘inflation-neutral growth’ regime. These results are summarized in the second and fourth 
column of Table 1 above.  
 
4.2.- The behavior of the economy in the short run and the growth trap 
The equilibrium condition in the goods market for an open economy with a 
government sector is: 
      ψππϕπ πππ ++++=−−−−−−−⋅+++ rggyggrxyxxxrfyffvrssyss ryryryry ˆˆˆ)ˆ ˆˆˆˆ(    (62) 
and, as a result, the rate of growth of output is given by: 
              
gxfvs
rgxfvsgxvsgxfvsy
yyyy
rrrr
ˆˆˆˆ
)()()(ˆ −−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−= ϕ
ϕπϕψϕ πππ       (63) 
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 If we assume, for consistency purposes that 0ˆˆˆˆ fgxfvs yyyy −−−ϕ  we have that, 
for plausible parameters:  
                                                 0
)(
)(ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ
p
gxfvs
vsxfg
r
y
yyyy
rrrr
−−−
−++=∂
∂
ϕ
ϕ
                                     (64) 
and                                           
)(
)(ˆ
ˆˆˆˆ gxfvs
vsxgy
yyyy −−−
−+=∂
∂
ϕ
ϕ
π
πππ                                            (65) 
where (65) has an ambiguous sign. The negative sign of (64) indicates that the DAD line 
in Figure 2 above is also downward-sloping in an open economy with a government 
sector. Rearranging (62), we can obtain the expression for the real rate of interest that 
clears the goods market when 0ˆ =y  (corresponding to point A in Figure 2 above) and 
when  or: gy n=ˆ
                              ϕ
πϕψϕ πππ
vsxfg
gxvsxfgvs
rrrr
y
+−−−
−−−−−−−−== )()(0ˆr                          (66) 
         ϕ
ϕπϕψϕ πππ
vsxfg
ggxfvsgxvsxfgvs
rrrr
nyyyyg n +−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−= )()()( ˆˆˆˆr      (67) 
where                                      ϕ
ϕ
π
πππ
vsxfg
gxvsr
rrrr
g n
+−−−
−−−=∂
∂ )(                                           (68)  
has an ambiguous sign and hence we can not know in advance how the DAD line in 
figure 2 will move as the rate of inflation changes. As before, we can think of rg n  as a 
pseudo-warranted real rate of interest in the sense of being the rate of interest that yields 
 for a given gy n=ˆ ϕ , π  and . Again, the warranted real rate of interest g yˆ r  will be 
the rate that yields  when 
g nϕ=ϕ
gnyˆ = ϕϕ =  and 1ˆ =g y . Setting r equal to zero in expression 
(63) will yield  for an open economy with a government sector, i.e., a point like B in yr=0
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Figure 2. Next, a favorable IS will lead the economy into a GT if expression (36) holds 
whereas and unfavorable DS will lead the economy into a GT if expression (38) holds. 
Finally, the variation in rg n  following a change in ϕ  also has an ambiguous sign since: 
5
)xrˆ gs ny
g )πxf +
xr−
rn
rn
                                                          
B
BBr g n
6
4 +=∂
∂
ϕ                                                       (69) 
where:  ()(4 fvsgvssB rrr −−+−⋅⋅−−−= ϕππ  
            [ ]ggxfvsxvsgvsvs nyyyyr )(( ˆˆˆˆ5 −−−+−−++++⋅= ϕπϕψϕ ππB  
and                                               )( 26 gfvsrB rr −−= ϕ
  Inflation shocks Aggregate demand shocks 
Closed economy without 
government sector + ? 
Open economy with 
government sector ? ? 
Note: A + means that the shock will lead to an increase in the pseudo-warranted rate whereas a ? means that the shock will have an 
impact of uncertain sign on the pseudo-warranted rate.   
 
Table 2: Impact of unfavorable ISs and favorable DSs on the pseudo-warranted real 
rate of interest 
 
4.3- The behavior of the ‘neutral’ real rate of interest and the liquidity trap 
 In this section we discuss the behavior of  in the aftermath of ISs and DSs for 
the case of an open economy with a government sector. We also discuss the contribution 
of the foreign and the government sector to the stabilizing properties of conventional 
monetary policy. Again, an explicit solution for  can be obtained by setting ϕϕ =  in 
(62) above and rearranging. It can be easily seen that rn  continues to be a function of π  
and  in an open economy with a government sector. yˆ
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4.3.1.- Inflation shocks  
 Differentiating (57) and rearranging we have that:  
                         
xfgvs
ydvsxfgdvsgg
r
rrrr
yyyyn
−−−
⋅−+++⋅−+= ϕ
ϕπϕπππ ˆ)()( ˆˆˆˆd                      (70) 
and if we initially assume that 0ˆ =yd  then (70) becomes: 
                                                 πdrnd ⋅Π= 4                                                      (71) 
where 0
)(
4 f
xfgvs
vsxg
rrrr −−−
−+= ϕΠ
ϕπππ  for plausible parameter values. 
As long as (39) does not hold, the minimum size of the variation in the current 
real interest rate required to offset an IS is: 
                                          πdrrndr ⋅Π+− 400 )(f                                               (72) 
and the economy will get into a LT in the aftermath of a favorable IS if: 
                                                        
)1(
)(
4
00
Π+
+−≤ ππ rnd                                                       (73) 
 If the change in the rate of inflation triggers a response by the CB in the form of a 
change in current real interest rates which in turn has an impact on output then we can not 
assume that  and we have that: 0ˆ =yd
                                                           πdrnd ⋅Π= 5                                                        (74) 
where 
[ ]
xfgvs
vsxfgvsxg
rrrr
yyyy
−−−
⋅⋅−+++−+= ϕ
δφϕϕπππ )()( ˆˆˆˆ
5Π     
and  ππ dd
dr
dr
ydyd ⋅⋅= ˆˆ  
The considerations made in section 3 above as to the possible destabilizing role 
played by conventional monetary policy when 0ˆ ≠yd  carry over to the current context.  
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Conventional monetary policy contributes to stabilizing the economy if  and is 
destabilizing if . Hence, when 
ΠΠ 45 p
ΠΠ 45 f 0ˆ ≠yd expressions (72) and (73) become: 
rrn − 00 )(
1(
( 0
+
−≤ r
n
Π4
Π4
0ˆ ≠yd
f r f
f r
fπ
                                          πddr ⋅Π+ 5f                                               (75) 
and                                                  
)
)
5
0
Π
+ππd                                                       (76) 
If we look at  and  above, we can analyze the role played by the foreign 
and government sector in the aftermath of ISs. When 
Π5
0ˆ =y
r
d  the role of the government 
sector is determined by the sign and magnitude of  in the denominator of . Since 
 is negative and the other terms in the denominator are positive, we have that the 
existence of a government sector contributes to a rise in the value of 
f
f r
Π4  thereby playing 
a destabilizing role. This is because, as inflation falls (rises) after a shock, the CB lowers 
(raises) current real interest rates and this leads to a fall (rise) in the budget deficit owing 
to lower (higher) interest payments on government debt. In turn, this translates into a fall 
(rise) in rn . The size of  depends positively on the amount of government debt in the 
hands of the private sector and negatively on the (average) length of maturity of the 
debt
f r
28. When , the role of the government sector is determined by the sign and 
magnitude of  and  in the denominator and numerator of yˆ Π5  respectively. In this 
second case, both  and  contribute to a higher value of f yˆ Π5  thus making the 
government sector be clearly destabilizing. This is because the negative sign of  - 
which results from the regular operation of automatic stabilizers - tends to increase the 
value of the numerator of Π  as long as 
f yˆ
5 0 . Thus, in the case of ISs the government 
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sector plays a destabilizing role and, in addition, the latter tends to be stronger the more 
forceful the response of the CB is, i.e., the larger is the value of δ .  
4
As for the foreign sector, when 0ˆ =yd  its role is determined by the sign and 
magnitude of  and  in the denominator and numerator of xr xπ Π  respectively. Since  
and the other terms in the denominator (except ) are positive, we have that it 
contributes to a fall in the value of 
xr
f r
Π4 . The same result holds for  in the numerator. 
Thus, when , the foreign sector plays unambiguously an stabilizing role. This is 
because as inflation falls (rises) after a shock the CB lowers (raises) current real interest 
rates and this leads to a currency depreciation (appreciation) in real terms which, in turn, 
raises (lowers) net exports and contributes to a rise (fall) in 
xπ
0ˆ =yd
rn . The negative sign of  
in the numerator reinforces this process. When 
xπ
0ˆ ≠y
x
d , the role of the foreign sector is 
determined by the sign and magnitude of  and  in the numerator and by  in the 
denominator of  respectively. In this case, the role of the foreign sector is ambiguous 
since the negative sign of  increases (as long as 
xπ yˆ
f
xr
Π5
xyˆ 0π ) the value of Π . Thus, in the 
case of ISs the role of the foreign sector can be stabilizing or destabilizing depending on 
the relative values of  and  on the one hand and  on the other hand. The higher 
the relative value of the former is vis-à-vis the value of latter the more likely it is that the 
CB will be able to stabilize the economy in the aftermath of ISs. Lastly, the joint 
operation of the foreign and government sectors will be stabilizing in the aftermath of ISs 
if  when  and if 
5
xπ
ˆ =y
xr x yˆ
ΠΠ 04 p 0d ΠΠ 15 p  when 0ˆ ≠yd . These results are presented in 
Tables 3 and 4 below.  
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Finally, when the economy is in a LT δ  becomes negative and the size of Π5 , 
other things being equal, will fall and may even become negative. However, as in the 
case of a closed economy without a government sector, this will not be enough to push 
the economy out of a LT in the absence of either unfavorable ISs and/or favorable DSs. 
Table 3 above summarizes the discussion on the contribution of the cyclical behavior of 
rn  to the stabilization power of conventional monetary policy in the wake of ISs and 
DSs. The behavior of the former reinforces the ability of conventional monetary policy to 
offset any type of shocks if  and vice-versa. Finally, the latter contributes to 
stabilizing the economy if 
0pΠi
ΠΠ  (4p5 ΠΠ 01 p  for the case of a closed economy without a 
government sector).     
 
 Closed economy without  government sector 
Open economy with government 
sector 
 Inflation shocks  (stabilizing/destabilizing) 
Inflation shocks  
(stabilizing/destabilizing) 
0ˆ =yd    Π / * 00 p 00 fΠ   Π / * 04 p 04 fΠ
0ˆ ≠yd  01 pΠ /  01 fΠ 05 pΠ /  05 fΠ
 CMP contributes to stabilization if 
CMP contributes to stabilization 
if 
 ΠΠ 01 p  ΠΠ 45 p  
 Aggregate demand shocks (stabilizing/destabilizing) 
Aggregate demand shocks  
(stabilizing/destabilizing) 
0ˆ/ =yddπ     / * 02 pΠ 02 fΠ    / * 06 pΠ 06 fΠ
0ˆ/ ≠yddπ  03 pΠ /  03 fΠ 07 pΠ /  07 fΠ
Note: The position of the asterisk * highlights either the actual or likely sign of Π i for plausible parameter values. The absence of an 
asterisk means that the sign of is ambiguous. CMP is the abbreviation for conventional monetary policy Π i
 
Table 3: Contribution of the ‘neutral’ real interest rate to the stabilization capacity 
of conventional monetary policy in the aftermath of ISs and DSs 
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4.3.2.- Aggregate demand shocks  
In an open economy with a government sector, and in addition to shocks hitting 
the saving ratio and the rate of accumulation, shocks may potentially arise from the 
foreign sector as well as from discretionary fiscal policy. However, as in the case of a 
closed economy without government sector, we assume that the economy is hit by a 
shock to the rate of capital accumulation, g albeit results are qualitatively similar if the 
source of the shock is different. If we differentiate (57) above and rearrange, we have that 
the change in the ‘neutral’ real rate of interest is: 
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If we initially assume that 0ˆ/ =yddπ , we obtain: 
                                                             d ε gnr ⋅Π= 6                                                       (78) 
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 +⋅−++
= ϕ
ϕ ε
Π   for plausible parameter values. 
 If condition (39) does not hold, the minimum size of the change in the current real 
interest rate required to offset a shock to g is: 
                                           dr ε gn rr ⋅Π+− 600 )(f                                               (79) 
and the economy will get into a LT following an adverse DS ( ) if: 0pε g
                                                        Π
+−≤
6
00 )( πε r
n
g                                                        (80) 
 Finally, when d 0ˆ/ ≠ydπ  the variation in rn  following a shock to g is:  
                                               d ε gnr ⋅Π= 7                                                         (81) 
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has an ambiguous sign. Hence, expressions (80) and (81) then become: 
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If we look at  and  above, we can analyze the role played by the foreign 
and government sectors in the aftermath of DSs. As for the government sector, its role is 
determined by the sign and magnitude of  and  in the denominator and numerator 
of  respectively. In the case of  the comments in the previous section carry over to 
this section. Conversely, the negative sign of  tends to reduce the size of Π  thereby 
exerting a stabilizing role through the operation of automatic stabilizers. In this case, the 
role of the government sector depends on the relative size of  vis-à-vis . Thus, one 
further result is that the stabilizing role of the government sector in the aftermath of DSs 
depends positively on the relative strength of automatic stabilizers and the average length 
of maturity of the government’s debt – for reasons explained above - and negatively on 
the amount of government debt in the hands of the private sector.   
Π6 Π7
f r f yˆ
Π7 f r
f yˆ 7
rf yˆ f
As for the foreign sector, when 0ˆ/ =yddπ  its role is determined by the sign and 
magnitude of  and  in the denominator and numerator of xr x yˆ Π6  respectively. Since  
and the other terms in the denominator except  are positive, we have that it contributes 
to a fall in the value of . The same result holds for  in the numerator. This result is 
reinforced when 
xr
f r
Π6
f
xyˆ
0d ˆ/ ydπ  and is (at least partially) offset when 0ˆ/ pyddπ  owing to 
 46
the negative sign of  in the numerator of xπ Π7 . Hence, in general, the foreign sector 
plays a stabilizing role in the case of DSs. Finally, the joint operation of the foreign and 
government sectors is stabilizing in the aftermath of DSs if ΠΠ 26 p  when 0ˆ/ =yddπ  
and if  when dΠΠ 37 p 0ˆ ≠yd/π . These results are summarized in Tables 3 and 4.  
0
Π0Π4 p
ˆ/ =yd
6
0
Π15 p
ˆ/ ≠yd
Π7
0fπ
rn g n
ω
 
 Inflation shocks  Aggregate demand shocks  
 
 
ˆ =yd
FS is stabilizing  
GS is destabilizing 
( ) 
 
0dπ
 
FS is stabilizing  
GS’s role is ambiguous 
( ΠΠ 2p ) 
 
 
ˆ ≠yd
GS is destabilizing  
FS’s role is ambiguous 
(Π ) 
 
0dπ
 
FS is stabilizing  
GS’s role is ambiguous 
( Π3p ) 
Note: FS and GS are respectively abbreviations for foreign and government sector. The terms in parentheses show, for each scenario, 
the condition that will hold should FS and GS jointly play a stabilizing role in the economy.  
 
Table 4: Contribution of the foreign and government sector to monetary policy’s 
stabilization power when   
 
5.- Monetary policy regimes: an attempt at generality 
 The analysis of growth and liquidity traps performed in sections 3 and 4 above 
yields some insights about the different situations policy-makers may face. We identify 
four regimes. Their basic features are shown in Table 5 below. The first column in Table 
5 shows the formal condition that denotes each regime as regards the value of  and r  
vis-à-vis the value of . The second and third columns indicate the trap or traps the 
economy has got into each regime if it has got into any trap at all. Finally, the last column 
contains some comments as to the nature of each regime. We explain each regime below.      
 The dynamics of the economy in the first two regimes are complex and depend on 
the particular values that model parameters take. Thus we do not claim generality for the 
stories we tell below. Rather, we will attempt to describe the dynamic processes in a 
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succinct way. The first regime corresponds to a situation where the economy is in a GT 
but not in a LT. The former means that whereas the latter implies that the CB can 
initially set interest rates low enough so as to yield a positive output-gap and, therefore, a 
rising rate of inflation. If the CB acts accordingly, inflation will rise. In turn, this will 
push 
gy npˆ
rg n  either upwards or downwards29. However as long as ωprg n
5 fΠ
 the (positive) 
output-gap will gradually narrow and, as a result of it, the rate of inflation will tend to 
decelerate. Furthermore, as inflation keeps rising, and as long as , the neutral 
interest rate 
0
rn  will rise eventually allowing the CB to fuel if it keeps real interest rates 
down. Yet, the behavior of rn  is also uncertain as the ambiguous sign of Π  highlights. 
If 
5
rg n  rises fast enough and the (negative) growth-gap gy n−ˆ  is closed before ωprn , 
then the economy will abandon the GT. Otherwise, the economy will fall into a LT 
before escaping the GT and will thus end up in the worst possible scenario. Hence, in this 
first regime, the higher are π∂∂ /rn , π∂/∂ rg n  and upward price and wage flexibility the 
more likely it is that the economy will escape the traps. The monetary policy implication 
that emerges from this first regime is that the CB should set interest rates as low as 
possible in order to increase the chances that the economy avoids falling into the traps. 
Notwithstanding, under an inflation-targeting strategy, the CB will tend to keep interest 
rates up as long as there is a positive output-gap and current inflation is above target 
inflation. Finally, this first regime is transitory since the economy will inevitably escape 
or fall into the traps. 
The second regime corresponds to a situation where the economy is in a LT but 
not in a GT. The former means that 0p&π  whereas the latter implies that the CB can set 
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interest rates low enough so as to yield a rate of growth of output . If it happens 
that 
gy nfˆ
0/ fπ∂∂ rg n  then, as inflation falls, rg n  will also fall thus gradually narrowing the 
(positive) growth-gap. The opposite will be true if ∂ 0/ pπ∂rg n . Likewise, a falling rate 
of inflation will push rn  downwards (upwards) if Π (Π ). If 05 f 5 p 0 rn  falls, this will 
speed up the deflationary process. As a result, if rg n
ωp
 rises or does not fall fast enough so 
as to allow the (negative) output-gap to be closed before rg n , then the economy will 
escape the LT. Otherwise, the economy will fall into a GT before escaping the LT. 
Hence, in this second regime, the lower are π∂∂ /rn  and ∂ π∂/rg n  - if they happen to be 
positive - the more likely it is that the economy escapes the traps. Conversely, if π∂∂ /rn  
and π∂∂ /rg n  happen to be negative, the opposite is true. As opposed to the first regime, 
the lower is downward price and wage flexibility, the more likely it is that the economy 
escapes the traps. Nevertheless, the monetary policy implication that results from this 
state of affairs is that the CB should keep interest rates down in order to retard the fall in 
the rate of inflation and the narrowing of the (positive) growth-gap. Finally, this second 
regime is also transitory.  
rg nff ω
rnn ff ω
ω pp rn,
ω ff rn,
 
Regime Liquidity trap Growth trap Comment 
rn  No Yes Transitory regime 
rg  Yes No Transitory regime 
ωrg n  Yes Yes Deflation + Stagnation 
ωrg n  No No Tranquil regime 
Table 5: Monetary policy regimes 
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 The third regime corresponds to a situation where ωprg n  and ωprn  so that the 
economy finds itself in both a LT and a GT. As a result, it will exhibit stagnant growth as 
well as a falling (and possibly negative) rate of inflation. No wonder this is the worst 
possible scenario that a CB can face. This regime captures well the features exhibited by 
the Japanese economy in the last decade, i.e., deflation, stagnant growth and, arguably, a 
large negative output-gap30. Finally, the last regime corresponds to a situation of 
tranquility in which the CB can set interest rates at the level required to yield a rate of 
growth of aggregate demand that matches an expanding potential output at the desired 
rate of inflation.  
 
6.- Conclusion 
Modern macroeconomic analysis has tended to skip the question through which 
mechanism a growing potential output level generates an equi-proportional increase in 
aggregate demand in the long run. Conventional stories rely on some kind of real balance 
effect to explain it. Yet this mechanism faces a well-known number of shortcomings 
notably its negligible size and, even worse, its uncertain sign. Alternative mechanisms are 
available but also tend to be unreliable. This study has presented a general theoretical 
framework for the analysis of the ability of conventional monetary policy to take the 
economy down its potential output path in the absence of any self-regulating mechanism 
other than the (modest) stabilization provided by the foreign sector and fiscal automatic 
stabilizers. For that purpose, we developed a simple theoretical model that explains the 
behavior of the ‘neutral’ interest rate and the ‘pseudo-warranted’ interest rate in the wake 
of different types of shocks. We defined the latter as the real interest rate that yields a rate 
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of growth of output equal to its ‘natural’ rate for a given level of capacity utilization and 
rate of inflation. The model covered both the case of a closed economy without a 
government sector and the case of an open economy with a government sector.  
We identified several different scenarios according to whether the short-run 
behavior of the ‘neutral’ interest rate enhances or weakens the stabilization power of 
conventional monetary policy and we determined under what conditions conventional 
monetary policy may be destabilizing The analysis of the steady-state properties of the 
model allowed us to identify several regimes depending on whether a rise in the target 
rate of inflation yields a faster or slower rate of growth of output when the ‘natural’ rate 
of growth of output is not fully exogenous. The model also allowed us to discuss the 
contribution of the foreign and government sector to the effectiveness of conventional 
monetary policy. In addition, we provided a formal definition of the notion of the 
liquidity trap and coined a complementary concept: the growth trap. Finally, and based 
on the previous concepts, we proposed a taxonomy of monetary policy regimes. Perhaps 
the most important question that we need to answer is how likely it is that conventional 
monetary policy can not yield a rate of growth of output along its potential path. This 
study has no answer for that question. We hope that the framework provided here and a 
good deal of empirical work will help answer that question in the future.   
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1 Notwithstanding its survival in macroeconomic theory, the real balance effect is missing from the 
FRB/US model.  
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2 The classical exposition of the unreliability of the real balance effect as a self-adjustment mechanism is in 
Tobin (1975). A recent discussion on the shortcomings of this effect can be found in Palacio-Vera (2005) 
and a lenghty analysis of the consequences of deflation is in Palley (2004). In contrast, some authors are 
supportive of the power of the real balance effect to stabilize the economy. For instance, Sims (2000) 
argues that there is a potential for a large real balance effect in a deflationary environment and that its 
presence ‘makes it extremely unlikely that we get into a liquidity trap’.   
 
3 Nevertheless he shows that the economy exhibits an unstable steady growth path albeit one that does not 
need to lead to cumulative divergence but may instead lead to cyclical fluctuations.  
  
4 For instance, in the study by Laubach and Williams (2001), the ‘natural’ real rate of interest is estimated 
using quarterly U.S. data over the period 1961 to 2000. In all the model specifications displayed, the 
authors find substantial variations in its estimated value throughout that period. For instance, in the baseline 
specification, the minimum value of the natural interest rate is found to be as low as 1.28 per cent whereas 
the maximum value is found to be 4.52 per cent. In addition, the authors concede there is sizeable 
uncertainty around most of their estimates of the natural rate of interest, the trend growth rate and potential 
output so the actual variation could be much larger. 
   
5 As argued in Sawyer (2001, p. 238), ‘the overall effect on realized real wages clearly depends on the 
relative size of the wage inflation and price inflation (and could depend on the responsiveness of wages and 
prices to unemployment and capacity utilization respectively and on the accuracy of wage and price 
expectation formation)’.  
  
6 A node is a singular point such that all integral curves pass through it (Gandolfo, 1997, p. 348). 
 
7 In particular, the complete expression for B.6 is: 
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1pγα 0/ fQd∂Υ∂ 0/ pPQd ∂∂ 0/ fNX ∂∂ ω∂
  
8 A saddle point is a singular point through which only two integral curves pass, which are asymptotes to 
all remaining integral curves. Whatever the direction of the movement along an integral curve, the motion 
is always away from the equilibrium point except for the one along one of the two asymptotes, which is 
called the stable arm of the saddle (Gandolfo, 1997, p. 348).  
 
9 Although not explicitly referred to as a LT situation, a brief discussion of this very same problem in the 
context of a simple model capturing the basic features of the so-called ‘New Consensus View’ in 
macroeconomics is undertaken in Arestis and Sawyer (2005). The authors conclude that CBs are unlikely 
to be able to offset a large adverse shock to investment demand through nominal interest rate cuts.    
  
10 For this second group of authors, the words pronounced by Kazuo Ueda at the 1999 JMCB Conference in 
Woodstock (Vermont) may serve to summarize their position: ‘Don’t put yourself in the position of zero 
interest rates. You’ll have to face a lot of difficulties. I can tell you it will be a lot more painful than you 
can possibly imagine’ (Ueda, 2000, p.1109).  
   
11 We assume firms use excess capacity to deter entry in an industry by making it unprofitable to potential 
new entrants (Spence, 1977).  
  
12 We implicitly assume that  when Y p= . ϕϕ = Y
 
13 It is not possible to say a priori how the debt service in real terms will vary since this ultimately depends 
on the behavior of real interest rates. However, our argument only applies to the impact on aggregate 
demand of changes in the rate of inflation for a given real interest rate. 
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µπ p+r g n 0f
  
14 This scenario changes considerably when inflation becomes negative. In a deflationary environment the 
redistribution of net worth away from net borrowers and towards net lenders will be larger and, in addition, 
there will be a redistribution of income in the same direction stemming from high (and possibly rising) real 
interest rates. 
 
15 Let us note that households are the ultimate owners of firms.  
 
16 As for the first result, our model suggests that factors like the ‘new economy’ do not affect, at least 
directly, to the steady-state neutral real rate of interest. As for the second result, one element embedded in 
the exogenous component of g may be the process of financialisation experienced by some OECD 
economies over the past decades. Financialisation is the term coined to refer to the shareholder revolution 
and the development of a market for corporate control which has shifted power to shareholders and 
changed management priorities leading to a reduction in the desired growth rate (see Stockhammer, 2004).  
 
17 Alternatively we may assume that the rate of growth of labor force is positively affected by the rate of 
growth of output through its effect on participation rates and/or the pace of immigration. 
 
18 See, for instance, the excellent presentation of this issue in Kohn (1981). 
 
19 In particular see expression 68 below.  
  
20 If we think of r as a medium-term interest rate, the minimum nominal interest rate the CB can set will be 
positive. This is because investors require a (time-varying) liquidity premium to purchase longer term 
financial assets. In turn, this suggests that considerations of liquidity preference may affect the likelihood 
the economy falls into a LT. In particular, expression (34) below would adopt the more general form 
 where µ  is determined by the liquidity premium required by investors.     
 
21 By an inflation shock we mean a one-time shock that affects the price level without affecting directly 
either the level or the rate of growth of potential output. In turn, the price level shock leads to a change in 
the current rate of inflation owing to the operation of adaptive expectations.  
 
22 See comment in endnote 20 above.  
 
23 However some authors have attributed the recent woes of the Japanese economy to the existence of a 
liquidity trap (Krugman, 1998). 
 
24 Krugman (1998) argues that if a CB can credibly commit to pursue inflation and ratify inflation when it 
comes, it should be able to increase inflationary expectations despite the absence of any traction on the 
economy by means of conventional monetary policy. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) present a more fully 
dynamic analysis of the problem. To them, a commitment to create subsequent inflation is presented as a 
commitment to keep interest rates low for some time in the future.  
     
25 Admittedly this is not a precise description of the behavior of short-term interest rates. This is because, 
for a given change in the rate of inflation, the postulated change in the real interest rate will depend on the 
initial value of the nominal interest rate being above the (zero) lower bound when inflation is positive but 
right at the lower bound when inflation is not positive. We are leaving aside those situations when inflation 
is positive but nominal interest rates are already at the zero lower bound as well as those ones when the rate 
of inflation is negative but nominal interest rates are still above the zero lower bound. In addition, under an 
inflation-targeting approach the CB will tend to raise interest rates when current inflation is above target 
and vice-versa. In order to make (44) fit this behavior we need to further assume that the initial rate of 
inflation equals target inflation when the rate of inflation is positive. 
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26 We may think of this case and similar ones as the case relevant for a time span long enough to allow the 
CB to observe the IS, adopt the appropriate policy response and let it have an impact on current output.   
 
27 We implicitly assume that purchasing power parity theory does not hold in the short run and probably 
either in the long run. 
  
28 This is because changes in (overnight) nominal interest rates induced by the CB tend to have a larger 
impact on short and medium-term rates than on long-term rates.   
 
29 It will push it upwards in a closed economy without a government sector but the sign of the effect is 
ambiguous for an open economy with a government sector. 
 
30 Krugman (1998) argues that the negative output-gap exhibited by the Japanese economy in the late 1990s 
is largely underestimated in official statistics. He adds that it could be as large as 8 per cent of GDP.  
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